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A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO RULE 26(c)
PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN AVIATION
LITIGATION
WILTON J. SMITH*
THE SUBJECT OF secrecy in the litigation process has
become a major issue, with diverse viewpoints being
presented in almost every legal journal. Although the
larger controversy might eventually be resolved, a present
need exists for efficiency in addressing protective orders
during the discovery portion of the litigation process.
The premise of this article is that there may well be infor-
mation that should be protected in aviation-related litiga-
tion concerning product liability and terrorist-caused
aviation disasters. This article, therefore, presents a pro-
cedure that has proved to be useful in facilitating discov-
ery and accommodating the use of protective orders while
minimizing court involvement in the process. The proce-
dure has been accepted by opposing parties and by courts
in both types of actions.'
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure au-
thorizes a court's issuance of orders protecting informa-
* Associate, Gilman, Olson & Pangia, Washington, D.C. Mr. Smith is a former
Naval Aviator who served as an Aeronautical Engineering Duty Officer.
I The proposed protective order procedure was accepted in a product liability
action by the court in Dejong v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 207
(W.D. Mo. 1988) (Case No. 86-3504-CV-S-2), and the order is presented in Ap-
pendix A. After agreement by the parties and acceptance by the court, the proce-
dure is being used in In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines Aircraft
Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1986, No. MDL-727 (E.D.N.Y. filed
1987), a terrorist bombing case. The plaintiffs' committee also proposed this pro-
cedure in the Pan Am 103 cases, In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie, Scotland on De-
cember 21, 1988, No. MDL-799 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1990) (1990 LEXIS 7485).
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tion upon the motion of a party.2 Most aviation cases
addressing product liability or terrorist-caused aviation
disasters require extensive discovery. Both types of litiga-
tion necessitate inquiry into information that one party
wants to keep confidential, which will prompt that party to
move for a protective order under Rule 26(c). Unfortu-
nately, the basic scope and purpose of discovery is lost in
the ensuing melee over what should be protected. That
is, discovery is designed to provide litigants with all of the
information that is necessary to correctly and completely
frame the issues for trial.3
Although some aspects of discovery remain constant,
the basis and scope of protective order requests vary by
the type of litigation. In product liability actions, protec-
five orders are sought to guard trade secrets or proprie-
tary information from potential competitors. In terrorist
cases, protection is allegedly sought to avoid publicizing
security measures. In both instances, however, the pro-
cess of formulating a protective order can slow discovery
and possibly work against the interests of all parties. The
party proposing a protective order in either type of action
runs the risk of having confidential information exposed if
counsel overreaches by seeking a blanket protective order
that cannot be justified. The party opposing a motion for
a protective order can delay discovery by insisting on full
Rule 26(c), in pertinent part, states the following:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person
from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court
in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to
a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including . . . (4) that certain matters not be
inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited to certain
matters [and] . . . (7) that a trade secret or other confidential re-
search, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or
be disclosed only in a designated way ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
-1 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (discussing discovery as a




disclosure even though some of the requested informa-
tion actually qualifies for protection.
Over the past few years, a means of accommodating
both sides has evolved, allowing efforts to stay focused
upon the fundamental issue framing purpose of discovery.
The basic steps of the procedure include the following:
1. Identify information that should be protected;
2. Identify information that cannot be protected;
3. Identify information for which the need for protection
is at issue; and
4. When there is disagreement, fight the protective or-
der battle.
This article approaches these steps in two parts. Part I
summarizes the basic principles that courts have crafted
to determine whether trade secret information deserves
protection. The section also presents court decisions con-
cerning such trade secret protective practices. Because
litigation arising from terrorist action is relatively new, the
basic principles center on the protection of trade secrets.
The considerations underlying these principles, however,
are largely adaptable to terrorist actions. Relying upon
the basic principles, Part II then addresses the procedures
developed for handling protective order issues in product
liability and terrorist actions.
I. BASIC PRINCIPLES
An attorney should consider the basic principles
presented in this section before proposing or preparing a
response to a proposed protective order. By following
these basic principles, a lawyer can shorten the time re-
quired to formulate protective order issues.
BASIC PRINCIPLE ONE: PROTECTIVE ORDERS ARE NOT
FAVORED AND SHOULD BE SOUGHT ONLY UPON
SOLID JUSTIFICATION
Our judicial system is the one nonaccountable branch
of government. The open court principle assures that the
76719911
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public functions as a check on the judicial system. 4 A fun-
damental tenet of American jurisprudence is that the
courts and their records are a matter of public record.5
Secrecy is the exception, not the rule.6 Furthermore, the
discovery rules were designed to "make a trial less a game
of blindman's [bluff] and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." '7
"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a statu-
tory presumption in favor of open discovery, extending
even to those materials not used at trial."" A wide use of
protective orders conflicts with that fundamental and im-
portant principle of openness. Consequently, the Rules
limit the use of protective orders and the scope of infor-
mation that should be kept from the public. Rules
26(c)(4) and 26(c)(7) allow a party to request protection
of certain information upon proper justification.9 In con-
sidering such requests, courts are to construe Rule 26(c)
so as "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."' 0 Thus, under the basic princi-
ples of our system, the parties should communicate in an
honest effort to minimize the amount of information pro-
tected without attempting to "straight-jacket the discov-
ery procedure . . . on the basis of speculative
4 See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
See generally, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-73
(1980) (providing the historical background of open trials); Warner Communications,
435 U.S. at 597 (holding that a common law right of access to trial records exists
to the extent necessary to supervise the judicial branch).
6 See Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 478 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(noting that one who seeks to avoid disclosure by a Rule 26(c) protective order
bears a heavy burden of proof).
7 United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (emphasis
added).
8 John Does I-VI v. Yogi, 110 F.R.D. 629, 632 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Tavou-
lareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1015 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (em-
phasizing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a statutory
presumption of openness in discovery).
I In most instances, Rule 26(c)(7) should apply to product liability actions and
Rule 26(c)(4) should govern terrorist actions.
10 Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing
FED. R. Civ. P. 1); see also Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1017-19 (discussing court con-




BASIC PRINCIPLE Two: PROTECTIVE ORDERS PROTECT
SPECIFIC INFORMATION
Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
tects information. The grant of a protective order turns on
an analysis of the content of the discovery requests and the
documents that are responsive to them. t2 The key focus
is upon the information in whatever form it appears."
The crux of any protective order battle is whether an
item of information merits protection. In product liability
cases, determining what should be protected can be com-
plex. Under Rule 26(c)(7), only information that is a
"trade secret, or other confidential research, develop-
ment, or commercial information" is entitled to protec-
tion. Too often, the court and opponents of a motion for
a protective order cannot determine from the motion
what information might be entitled to protection. While
vagueness might seem advantageous to the proponent,
such tactics waste the court's time and subject the propo-
nent's client to a strong likelihood that his truly confiden-
tial information may not be protected. Improperly
framed motions for protective orders are usually the re-
sult of poor pleading practices, unfamiliarity with the
technology involved in the case, or "puffing." A sug-
" Neonex Int'l Ltd. v. Norris Grain Co., 338 F. Supp. 845,854 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
see also John Does I-VI, 110 F.R.D. at 659 (discussing the need for honest discovery
efforts to avoid undue speculation and delay).
12 Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
court determined that the preferable option is "to review the contents of each
deposition individually, restricting dissemination of only such information as [is]
found specifically likely to [cause injury to the defendants]." Id. (citation omit-
ted); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866,
884 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stating that resolution of document confidentiality requires
an analysis of the contents, not just a general description of the documents).
i Procter & Gamble Co. v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 326, 331 (D. Del.
1986). In denying trade secret status to information gathered by the defendant
and classified as "secret," the court noted that "not all 'information' which is 'se-
cret' necessarily qualifies for trade secret protection. The document must contain
information which deserves protection." Id. (citation omitted).
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gested approach to analyzing and limiting such motions is
discussed below.
A. State Law Defines Trade Secrets
State law defines trade secrets. Most states define trade
secrets either under section 757 of the Restatement of
Torts' 4 or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.' 5 In diversity
cases, federal courts look to state law for the definition of
a trade secret.' 6  Often a choice of law must be made to
determine what definition of trade secret should be used
before seeking a protective order. For example, aviation
cases in federal court are commonly transferred from one
district to another.' 7 When an action has been so trans-
ferred, the law of the transferor forum provides the basis
for decision in the transferee forum,' 8 including the
,4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). Section 757 defines a
trade secret as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compi-
lation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical com-
pound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials,
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers.
Id.; see, e.g., Smith v. BIC Corp., 869 F.2d 194, 199 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
Pennsylvania has adopted the Restatement definition of trade secret).
is See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1(d) (West 1990).
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the sub-
ject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to main-
tain its secrecy.
Id.
if, See, e.g., Smith, 869 F.2d at 199 (in deciding whether to protect information
under Rule 26(c), the Third Circuit looked to Pennsylvania law).
7 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982). "For the convenience of the parties and wit-
nesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
I, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). The court concluded "that in
cases ... where the defendants seek transfer, the transferee district court must be
obligated to apply the state law that would have been applied if there had been no
change of venue. A change of venue under § 1404(a) generally should be, with
respect to state law, but a change of courtrooms." Id. at 639; see also Ferens v.
John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990) (holding that a transferee court must also
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choice of law principles of the transferor forum.' 9 Since
state law provides the fundamental definitions, the appli-
cable state law must be determined.
B. Only the Party Possessing Information Can Demonstrate the
Need for Confidentiality and the Harm of Disclosure
Once the appropriate state trade secret law is identified,
the determinative question is whether the information to
be protected is truly a trade secret. Even if a trade secret
is involved, a showing of "good cause" is required to jus-
tify protection from disclosure.2 0  Good cause must be
shown with particularity. 2' In ruling on the protective or-
der, a court also considers the relative hardship that
would be suffered by the nonmoving party if the order
were granted.22
General allegations of trade secrecy and harm do not
establish good cause for protection.2 3 Logically, the party
possessing the trade secret or other confidential informa-
tion is the one who must establish good cause because
only that party possesses the knowledge required to meet
the burden.24 A particularity requirement assures that
follow the choice of law rules of the transferor court when the plaintiff seeks the
transfer).
19 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that con-
flict of law questions were to be settled by Delaware law, when an action for
breach of a New York contract was filed in Delaware federal court).
20 General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.
1973) (holding that Rule 26(c) requires a showing of good cause through specific
factual allegations prior to the issuance of a protective order), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1162 (1974).
21 Id. Specifically, the court stated that a showing of good cause "contemplates
a 'particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped
and conclusory statements.' " Id. (citation omitted); see also United States v. Gar-
rett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the lower court erred in
issuing a protective order barring all discovery based upon an unsupported gov-
ernment request and without citing any justification).
22 General Dynamics, 481 F.2d at 1212.
23 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986);
Garrett, 571 F.2d at 1326 n.3; Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 117 F.R.D. 506, 508
(E.D.N.Y. 1987).
24 American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Carter Prods., Inc., v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868, 872-73 (7th Cir. 1966); In re
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court records will remain public to the fullest possible ex-
tent.25 Indeed, unquestioned acceptance of a manufac-
turer's unsupported statements that some information
deserves confidentiality could lead to extreme embarrass-
ment for the manufacturer's attorney as the proceedings
progress.
Under Rule 26(c)(7), the party seeking a protective or-
der has the burden of demonstrating good cause by show-
ing that the specific material sought to be protected is
actually kept confidential 26 and that its disclosure will
cause specific harm to that party. 7 More specifically, the
requirements for protection under Rule 26(c)(7) include a
showing that the information is in fact a trade secret, that
the release of that information will result in demonstrable
harm, and that good cause for protection exists. 8
Courts have attempted to formulate a good cause defi-
nition for trade secrets. For example, the Federal District
Court for the District of Columbia explained that "[t]o es-
tablish good cause under Rule 26(c) the courts have gen-
erally required a 'particular and specific demonstration of
fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory
statements .... , "29 That is, "[w]ith respect to the claim of
confidential business information, this standard demands
that the company prove that disclosure will result in a
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D.
34, 40 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
2.1 Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 40 n.7 (citing Brown & William-
son Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983)).
26 United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In determining
whether to protect a trade secret, the court will consider the measures taken by
the movant to guard the information. Id. at 47.
27 General Dynamics, 481 F.2d at 1212 (stating that the court must consider the
burden to the opposing party that results from the issuance of a protective order);
Kamp Implement Co. v. J.I. Case Co., 630 F. Supp. 218, 219 (D. Mont. 1986)
(stressing that few courts will issue a broad protective order, absent a showing of
serious injury); United States v. Exxon Corp., 94 F.R.D. 250, 251 (D.D.C. 1981)
(requiring a specific demonstration of serious injury to establish good cause for
protection of business information); Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337, 340 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) (requiring a particularized showing of harm).
28 Cuno, 117 F.R.D. at 507; Zenith Radio, 529 F. Supp. at 866.
29 Exxon, 94 F.R.D. at 251 (quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2035 (1970)).
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'clearly defined and very serious injury to its business.' ,,30
During the IBM antitrust cases, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of New York also stated that
good cause requires an applicant "to demonstrate that
disclosure of allegedly confidential information will work
a clearly defined and very serious injury to his business. '3" Cer-
tain common elements of the good cause requirement
have emerged from decisions involving trade secrets or
confidential information. Some of these elements are set
forth below.
1. The Proponent Must Actively Guard Its Trade Secrets
Trade secrets demand a sort of secrecy pledge by those
to whom they are revealed. The proponent must show
that the entire organization has endeavored to control ac-
cess to such information and that measures are taken to
safeguard secrecy.3 2 To satisfy this requirement, the pro-
ponent cannot make general allegations but must show
the actual scope of distribution of specific information
and the means of protecting the confidentiality of such in-
formation during distribution.3 State trade secret law
can assist in determining the acceptable safeguards.
2. The Information Sought to Be Protected Must Be Current
Only current data or information is protected. If infor-
mation is not current, a difficulty arises in showing how its
release can cause commercial harm.3 1 Courts have re-
I0 d. (quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
3, IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 46 (emphasis in original).
31 Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203, aff'd on rehearing, 442 F.
Supp. 1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The court will follow traditional trade secret guide-
lines in deciding whether the organization has attempted to protect the informa-
tion. The factors considered include "(1) the extent to which information is
known outside the business; (2) the extent to which information is known to those
inside the business; (3) the measures taken to guard the secrecy of the informa-
tion; and (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors." Id.
" See Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(holding that crash test results and design information were not confidential be-
cause GM failed to specify the means by which secrecy was maintained and no
particularized need for confidentiality was established).
34 IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 49 (ruling that protection was unavailable for outdated but
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fused to protect business records and other such data that
were five years old,3 5 three years old,36 and even one year
old.3 7 The basic criterion underlying these determina-
tions was whether the data revealed anything concerning
the movant's contemporary operations .3  This concept
applies to aviation product liability actions when a party
seeks protection for results of test data or design com-
promises made by a manufacturer for an aircraft no
longer in production. In order to gain protection, the
proponent should demonstrate that release of such infor-
mation would have an effect on that manufacturer's cur-
rent operations.
3. Patented Information Cannot Be Protected
If the information sought to be protected has been pat-
ented by the proponent, a protective order is unobtain-
able because the patent process is based upon public
disclosure.39
4. Information That Is Ascertainable Through Inspection or By
Reverse Engineering Cannot be Protected
A trade secret is destroyed if a product containing that
secret is placed upon the open market and the secret can
be ascertained through inspection. 0 Further, the Third
Circuit has held that a sale on the open market submits
trade secrets to public disclosure through "reverse engi-
neering," which was explained as follows:
allegedly confidential information, unless the movant established that disclosure
would cause a clearly defined and very serious injury to business).
- Exxon, 94 F.R.D. at 252.
.16 United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 932 (1962).
37 Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
- See Zenith Radio, 529 F. Supp. at 877, 891 (noting that difficulty arises in draw-
ing temporal boundaries to govern protection of information, particularly when
deciding how the information impacts the contemporary operations of a party).
39 Midland-Ross Corp. v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171, 177 (W.D.
Pa.), aff'dper curiam, 435 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970). The court held that "[t]he very
act of publishing a trade secret in a patent destroys the secretive nature of that




Even though a marketed product would have to be ren-
dered inoperative and examined by a skilled engineer in
order for a discovery to be made of the trade secrets
therein, the sale of such a product nevertheless constitutes
a public disclosure which will defeat a claim founded upon
the trade secrets contained in the product.4
In aviation cases, the general public, including a com-
petitor, may well have access to aircraft or aircraft sys-
tems. Manufacturers publish masses of technical data to
support aircraft certification as required by the Federal
Aviation Administration. To secure a protective order,
a proponent must demonstrate that the information it
seeks to protect is incapable of being reverse-engineered
from the aircraft itself or from the technical information
that the manufacturer has released to the public either
pursuant to a statutory duty or for commercial reasons.
Furthermore, courts have been reluctant to protect infor-
mation that is not novel and probably already known or
that could be reconstructed from openly available data by
those familiar with the field. 3
5. Information Capable of Being Deduced Through
Observation Cannot Be Protected
Confidential business information or data from which a
competitor can deduce the business operations of a mo-
vant are treated differently. In the IBM antitrust cases,
41 Id. (citing Midland-Ross Corp. v. Yokana, 293 F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 1961)).
The Third Circuit has continued to adhere to the principle of reverse engineering.
See Smith, 869 F.2d at 199-200.
42 Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.1-621
(1990); Airworthiness Standards: Normal, Utility and Acrobatic Airplanes, 14
C.F.R. §§ 23.1-.1589 (1990); Airworthiness Standards, Aircraft Engines, 14
C.F.R. §§ 33.1-.99 (1990); Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance, Rebuilding
and Alteration, 14 C.F.R. §§ 43.1-17 (1990).
43 Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001, 1008 (3d Cir. 1976)
(holding that the methodology to calculate back pay proposal was not protected
information because it was known by those in the field of employment discrimina-
tion law);John Does l-VI, 110 F.R.D. 633 (holding that "a unique body of knowl-
edge" insufficiently identified information requiring protection in a fraudulent
misrepresentation action against a nonprofit corporation offering self-realization
courses).
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the court weighed the age of data against how that data
might assist a competitor in determining information
about the movant's current operations.44 That analysis
turned on whether an informed competitor could arrive at
similar deductions through the compilation of data gener-
ally available in the industry and through observation of
the movant's actions within the industry. Thus, the fun-
damental considerations are the age and usefulness of the
information and the ease with which competitors can gain
access to it.
4 5
Similarly, with respect to manufacturing, processing, or
design information, protection is unavailable for an al-
leged trade secret that only involves the following: (1)
concepts that are matters of general scientific knowledge;
(2) material that is ascertainable through the application
of general scientific or engineering principles; or (3) data
compiled through the use of measuring methods that are
of general scientific knowledge in the industry.46 Even
observations and photographs made by the proponent
cannot be protected unless the subject matter meets the
standards required for protection.47
44 IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 47-49. The court reviewed pretrial orders protecting por-
tions of testimony that covered revenues, sales, and manufacturing data. The age
of the data ranged from 3 to 15 years. Although the data was not readily available
to the public, the court found that value of the data to competitors was too specu-
lative and did not warrant protection. Id.
41 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 574 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). "An important factor in determining whether disclosure will cause com-
petitive harm is whether the information that the party seeks to protect is current
or stale." Id. at 575; see also Exxon, 94 F.R.D. at 252 (holding that the age and
content of allegedly confidential documents did not establish a need for protec-
tion). In Exxon, the company sought restrictions on the release of 500 documents.
At the time of the motion for a protective order, the government had possession
of all of the documents. In denying the motion, the court reviewed the age and
content of the materials, finding that all of the documents were at least five years
old and contained no information that would harm Exxon's competitive advan-
tage. Id. at 251-52.
46 IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 48-49.
47 Procter & Gamble, Ill F.R.D. at 329. Procter & Gamble, a patent infringement
case, involved an attempt to gain access to various documents, including photo-
graphs of a Keebler facility. The court ruled that Keebler failed to satisfy the
burden of showing that the photographic information was a trade secret under
Rule 26(c). That is, the photographs did not contain any confidential information
[56
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Often, manufacturers claim that information concern-
ing the performance evaluation, processing, testing, de-
signing, or general development of its aircraft is unique.
General acceptance of this proposition, however, is
doubtful because it is difficult to conceive that unique in-
formation permeates all such activities by any manufac-
turer. In aviation litigation, discovery requests often seek
design and test data developed to establish technical pa-
rameters for airframe or system design. Vibrational test-
ing, material process specifications, flight test data, and
other technical data adequate to ensure proper operation
of an aircraft or system are based upon techniques gener-
ally known within the aircraft industry. Such techniques
have evolved to meet regulatory standards as well as the
research and development needs of the aerospace
industry.
The proponent must specify how such information is
unique to that manufacturer and establish that the data or
technique is not generally known or used throughout the
aviation industry. The proponent who claims that infor-
mation is unique, however, also runs the risk of demon-
strating the enhanced need of the party requesting that
information.48
6. Disclosure to the Government May Bar Protection
When information that is claimed to be confidential was
previously disclosed to the government, that information
is a matter of public record and cannot be the subject of a
protective order.49 For example, the Type Certificate
and were taken from a vantage point available to anyone passing the facility. Id. If
extended beyond a certain point, however, this observation standard might de-
stroy any proprietary or confidential standing. For example, one skilled in the
field of photoanalysis could determine considerable information about the per-
formance of a jet aircraft by analysis of the size and shape of its engine intakes.
40 American Standard, 828 F.2d at 734. "Need is enhanced when information is
uniquely available from the party from whom it is sought." Id. at 743; see Heat &
Control, 784 F.2d at 1025; Carter Prods., 360 F.2d at 872-73.
49 Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726. The court held that information relating to the
design of a fuel system was not confidential because the manufacturer admitted
that some of the information was previously disclosed to the government. Id.
1991] 777
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Data Sheet, repair and flight manuals, and any Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) airworthiness directives
are matters of public notice.50
When information has been voluntarily produced to the
government, but not disclosed, the movant still must spe-
cifically demonstrate that the information which it seeks to
protect is a trade secret or confidential commercial infor-
mation.5' This consideration may arise in aviation litiga-
tion when a manufacturer has released information to the
government through interaction with the FAA. Thus,
although the FAA has the right to refuse to release "pro-
prietary data" pursuant to a Freedom of Information
Act5 2 request, the manufacturer still must justify protec-
tion from discovery under Rule 26(c)(7).
BASIC PRINCIPLE THREE: BLANKET PROTECTIVE ORDERS
ARE NOT FAVORED
Often, a party will propose a blanket protective order.
Respondent counsel, who may not have the faintest idea
whether the material merits protection, may agree to such
a protective order to get on with discovery, which can be a
mistake for two reasons. First, although courts dislike
blanket protective orders,53 a court may force the litigant
who later seeks relief from a blanket protective order to
live with the results of the bargain to which he agreed."M
50 For reference to some reporting and certification requirements, see supra
note 42.
-51 Rule 26(c) provides that a protective order shall issue only upon a showing of
good cause, and the movant bears the burden of showing the necessity to protect
the information. As discussed above, good cause requires a specific demonstra-
tion of need. Garrett, 571 F.2d at 1326 n.3; see Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme,
94 F.R.D. 27, 29 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
52 28 U.S.C. § 501 (1982).
-1 See, e.g.,John Does I-VI, 110 F.R.D. at 633 (holding that defendants failed to
establish with adequate specificity that documents contained proprietary informa-
tion that would justify blanket protection).
See Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 111 F.R.D. 653, 659 (D.D.C. 1986);
Zenith Radio, 529 F. Supp. at 893. According to the Tavoulareas court, when parties
benefit from and rely upon a former protective order and the order served the
ends of Rule 26, then "the burden of demonstrating good cause is tempered by its
reliance on the protective order .... [and] [t]his is so even though the protective
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Second, a blanket protective order shifts the burden from
the proponent of protection to the respondent, contrary
to Rule 26(c), by forcing the respondent to determine, af-
ter the fact of production, whether protected information
merits any protection at all. Accordingly, blanket protec-
tive orders "only postpone, rather than prevent, the need
for the [c]ourt to closely scrutinize discovery materials to
see if the seal is justified."55
Under most blanket protective orders, the party pos-
sessing the information unilaterally can mark as confiden-
tial any document it chooses to produce. Such a priori
presumptions of confidentiality contravene the require-
ment of Rule 26(c)(7) for a particularized showing.56
Even more fundamentally, blanket protective orders force
the respondent to analyze information to determine
whether the proponent has met the burden of showing
cause for protection. The respondent must then seek the
Court's intervention each time it questions the validity of
a particular classification. Such reversal of the burden re-
quired under Rule 26(c)(7) has been rejected by the
courts .
Most courts that have addressed blanket protective or-
ders have done so after a motion for reconsideration by a
party who had stipulated to such an order and then
sought declassification from that order. This pattern is
true of the case most cited by proponents of blanket or-
order may originally have been entered before, or even without, a finding of good
cause." Tavoulareas, Il1 F.R.D. at 659.
- John Does I-VI, 110 F.R.D. at 632.
56 See, e.g., Kamp Implement, 630 F. Supp. at 219 (holding that the movant bears
the burden of showing the necessity for a protective order by pleading particular
or specific facts). But cf. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, 858 F.2d 775, 777, 790
(1st Cir. 1988) (granting a blanket protective order because massive numbers of
documents prevented defendant from physically designating each individual doc-
ument as confidential or secret), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
57 See, e.g., Agent Orange, 104 F.R.D. at 568-69 (placing the burden on the manu-
facturer to show good cause for continued protection of confidential material
under a protective order); Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. at 34 (ruling
that defendants had burden of showing that their confidentiality interest out-
weighed public access interests, when justifying the continuation of a protective
order).
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ders, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. 58
Proponents do not usually mention, however, that the
Zenith Radio court was called upon to declassify many
thousands of documents after more than ten years of dis-
covery under a protective order previously agreed to by
the parties to that action. 59 Generally, no acceptable justi-
fication will exist for agreeing to a blanket protective or-
der at the beginning of aviation product liability actions.
BASIC PRINCIPLE FOUR: RETROACTIVE PROTECTION IS
NOT AVAILABLE
A protective order cannot allow a proponent to retroac-
tively classify documents previously produced. Prior pro-
duction moots a motion for a protective order.60 A
protective order must be obtained before the date set for
production of discovery, and failure to move by that date
will likely preclude such objection and request later.6'
When more than one action over the same issue is in-
volved, the proponent cannot avoid discovery in one ac-
tion or argue retroactive confidentiality on the basis of
disclosure of the same documents to an adversary bound
by a protective order in another action.62
BASIC PRINCIPLE FIVE: PROTECTED INFORMATION CAN BE
SHARED
The limitations inherent in some protective orders re-
strict the ability of a party to pursue an action at law. The
most common limitation concerns sharing the fruits of
discovery with other attorneys involved in similar litiga-
529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Id. at 873-74.
o United States v. IBM Corp., 70 F.R.D. 700, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
0 Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62,67 (D.P.R.
1981); see also United States v. Portland Cement Co., 338 F.2d 798, 803 (10th Cir.
1964) (holding that orders for protection of parties or deponents must be issued
prior to the taking of depositions); 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2035 (1970).
62 See Carter-Wallace v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 92 F.R.D. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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tion. Sharing of data is encouraged by the courts because
it is consistent with "the just, speedy, and inexpensive de-
termination of every action."6 Courts have thus rejected
restrictions on the sharing of information as adverse to
the proper function of the judicial system.64 Broad pro-
tective orders that absolutely forbid such exchange of in-
formation are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the underlying public interest in an effi-
cient judicial system. 65
Courts review numerous factors when a respondent op-
poses a protective order sought by a large corporation.
For instance, the court in United States v. Hooker Chemical &
Plastics Corp.66 considered the disparity in resources be-
tween an individual plaintiff and a large corporation.67
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see, e.g., Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 579-80 (D.
Colo. 1982) (holding that a plaintiffs' attorneys' discovery information exchange
group reduces the effort and expense incurred by all parties and vacating the pro-
tective order prohibiting such exchanges); Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94
F.R.D. at 28-30 (noting that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not prohibit
collaboration and sharing of information by litigants); Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726
(stating that the federal rules do not prevent collaboration among litigants). Re-
cently, the Texas Supreme Court reviewed the law applicable to restrictions on
sharing of information. The court rejected such restrictions, holding that shared
discovery is an "effective means to insure full and fair disclosure." Garcia v. Peep-
les, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987). The court further noted that shared dis-
covery makes the system more truthful and efficient. Id.
- John Does I-VI, 110 F.R.D. at 633; see also Kamp Implement, 630 F. Supp. at 219-
20 (noting that the possibility that a party may share the discovery with another
person or entity is generally not considered as part of a good cause showing for a
protective order).
65 See, e.g.,John Does I-VI, 110 F.R.D. at 631, 635-36 (stating that a broad protec-
tive order may be unduly burdensome and prejudicial, which would not satisfy the
court's duty to ensure an efficient resolution to all actions).
90 F.R.D. 421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
67 Id.
Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection
with other litigation, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs' at-
torneys, comes squarely within the purposes of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.... Such cooperation among litigants promotes the
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action as well as con-
servation of judicial resources. This is particularly the case in law-
suits where the resources available to the parties are uneven.
[Otherwise,] [i]ndividuals who are plaintiffs might have a most diffi-
cult time extracting information ....
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Hooker court also held that the use of a procedure
whereby the proponent designates documents as "confi-
dential" under a "general practice" does not mean that
the proposed practice must be adopted by the unconsenting
respondent.68
II. A PROCEDURE FOR PROTECTIVE ORDERS
Courts recognize that discovery disputes can take up in-
ordinate amounts of their time.69 Federal district courts
have formulated local rules that attempt to reduce this
problem. Local solutions range from requiring a simple
certification by counsel that they have attempted without
success to resolve the dispute 70 to elaborate procedures
requiring parties to file one document stipulating to the
issues they want resolved. 7' The basic purpose of such
Id. at 425. Although large corporate parties often agree to broad protective
orders as a means of protection from competing businesses and potential liti-
gants, an unreceptive party is not bound to accept this practice. Id.
69 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 784 F.2d 1108, 1122 n.19 (3d Cir.
1986) (discussing the usefulness of umbrella protective orders, the court stated
that "[in a very large case, the document-by-document approach" might be so
time-consuming that it "could cripple the court").
70 See, e.g., W.D. PA. R. 4(a)(2). The Western District of Pennsylvania local rule
requires in pertinent part:
The Clerk of Court shall not accept for filing under the Rules of
Civil Procedure any motion relating to discovery unless said motion
is accompanied by a Certificate from counsel of record certifying
that they have conferred and consulted with respect to each matter
set forth in said motions and are unable to resolve the differences
which exist. Said Certificate shall set forth the exact time and place
of the conference and consultation. Where counsel for movant can-
not furnish the required Certificate he shall furnish an alternate Cer-
tificate stating that opposing counsel has refused to so meet and
confer or to sign the required Certificate or stating such other facts
and circumstances supporting the absence of the required Certifi-
cate and movant's efforts to obtain compliance by opposing counsel.
Id.
7 See, e.g., C.D. CAL. R. 7.15. The Central District of California local rule pro-
vides in pertinent part:
7.15.1 Meeting of Counsel. Prior to the filing of any motion relating to
discovery pursuant to FR Civ P 26-37, counsel for the parties shall
meet in person in a good faith effort to eliminate the necessity for
hearing the motion or to eliminate as many of the disputes as possi-
ble. It shall be the responsibility of counsel for the moving party to
arrange for the conference. Unless relieved by order of the Court
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rules is to force the parties to work out their own discov-
ery problems. Although courts have the discretion to
fashion appropriate protective orders,72 the results can be
less than desirable when they are forced sua sponte to
fashion protective orders because the parties cannot agree
on the issues involved."
The basic approach discussed in this section, which is
an important development in the protective order pro-
cess, allows the parties to work out a protective order that
combines an agreement on the method for determining
what information is protected with an agreement on how
to handle protected material. This procedure accommo-
dates both sides, and more importantly, speeds up the
resolution of disputes, permitting discovery to proceed as
rapidly as possible. The basic directive under which this
protective order procedure was developed is Rule
upon good cause shown or agreement of the parties, counsel for the
opposing party shall meet with counsel for the moving party within
ten (10) days of service upon him of a letter requesting such meeting
and specifying the terms of the discovery order to be sought.
7.15.2. Moving Papers. If counsel are unable to settle their differ-
ences, they shall formulate a written stipulation specifying separately
and with particularity each issue that remains to be determined at
the hearing and the contentions and points and authorities of each
party as to each issue. The stipulation must be set forth in one docu-
ment which shall contain all such issues in dispute and the conten-
tions and points and authorities of each party. The stipulation shall
not refer the Court to other documents in the file. For example, if
the sufficiency of an answer to an interrogatory is in issue, the stipu-
lation shall contain, verbatim, both the interrogatory and the alleg-
edly insufficient answer, followed by each party's contentions,
separately stated. The stipulation shall be filed and served with the
notice of motion. In the absence of such stipulation, or a declaration
of counsel of non-cooperation by the opposing party, the Court will
not consider any discovery motion unless otherwise ordered upon
good cause shown. The motion shall be heard on the next suc-
ceeding Motion Day which shall be no earlier than ten (10) days after
the filing of the motion.
Id.
72 Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 684 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1011 (1986).
73 For example, although the decision was not sua sponte, the Cipollone court
was forced to reluctantly uphold a protective order because the plaintiff refused to
keep the information confidential. Cipollone, 784 F.2d at 1108.
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26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Under
this rule, the scope of discoverable subject matter can be
far-ranging in both product liability and terrorist litiga-
tion. Although information may become protected at
some point, the basic policy of the federal rules is that a
litigant is entitled to see information relevant to the litiga-
tion subject matter.7 5
A maxim exists that, during litigation, attorneys face
too many tasks to waste time playing a game of
"blindman's bluff" with information. Frequently, these
same attorneys will not have the technical background in
either product development or antiterrorist security prop-
erly to frame issues concerning confidentiality. Under the
procedure presented in this section, litigants gain effi-
ciency by framing the basic protective order issues and
hammering out an approach to protective orders prior to
taking such issues to the court. This procedure is partic-
ularly important for terrorist cases in which relevant infor-
mation might involve sensitive security matters.
The procedure set forth below involves some measure
of compromise between the parties but improves effi-
ciency for both sides and for the court. Sample protective
order agreements for both a product liability action and a
terrorist action are presented as Appendices A and B to
this article.76 Because the content of any particular pro-
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
(1) In General. Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the
party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the
identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discovera-
ble matter. It is not grounds for objection that the information
sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought ap-
pears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.
Id.
75 For a discussion of the purposes of discovery, see supra notes 4-11 and ac-
companying text.
76 The procedure presented in Appendix A was used in Dejong v. Bell Helicop-
ter Textron, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 207 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Case No. 86-3504-CV-S-2).
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tective order agreement can be as varied as the subject
matter under litigation, only the general format of these
agreements is described below.
A. Statement of Purpose
Litigants need to clearly understand the proposed
agreement in the specific context of the litigation at hand.
For terrorist actions, this understanding is particularly im-
portant because dire consequences could result for per-
sons far removed from the litigation. The release of
confidential information needed to fully litigate such ac-
tions could tragically affect these persons. Product liabil-
ity actions do not have such dramatic possibilities, but
when the parties must first consider the underlying bases
for protection, the subsequent disputes are properly
framed for resolution. A statement of the purpose for a
protective order procedure will also assist a court faced
with a protective order dispute.
The following example, agreed to by counsel in the
TWA 840 bombing case, illustrates both the form and ra-
tionale for a statement of purpose:
STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
Plaintiffs and defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
(hereinafter "TWA") hereby stipulate and agree to the
terms of this Protective Order as set forth below. This
Protective Order is agreed to gain recognition of the
following:
a. That the nature of the instant action can involve dis-
covery into areas of information regarding security proce-
dures which could be considered to be highly sensitive;
b. That during the course of the instant action plain-
tiffs may seek discovery of information which could be
considered to be confidential under Rule 26(c), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
The procedure presented in Appendix B was used in In re Inflight Explosion on
Trans World Airlines Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on April 2, 1986, No.
MDL-727 (E.D.N.Y. filed 1987).
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c. That there should be no confusion over the nature,
range and extent of confidential information; and
d. That the burden of showing good cause for protec-
tion of the information sought to be protected lies with
the party from whom discovery is sought. Rule 26(c), Fed.
R. Civ. p. 77
In the early stages of litigation, the parties often tend to
approach the issue of protection like blind bulls in a dark
room. A preliminary meeting between counsel for each
party to work out the basic purpose of a protective order
within the particular litigation will narrow the issues re-
garding protection, thereby speeding up discovery.
B. Initial Procedure
1. Notification
The party seeking discovery has the burden of asking
the right questions. Often, early discovery requests are
wide-ranging, but if they are not vague, the answering
party has a duty to supply answers and produce docu-
ments and material responsive to such requests. The an-
swering party must respond within thirty days to
discovery requests under Rules 33(a) and 34(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 78 Determining whether
discovery requests cover information that might qualify
for protection is not a lengthy process. The requesting
party may reasonably ask that the party who has the duty
to produce information notify them earlier than the thirty
day period if the respondent plans to seek protection for
requested information.
The notification period can vary depending upon the
action. In product liability cases, a fifteen day interval is
11 See Appendix B; Explosion on Trans World Airlines Aircraft, No. MDL-727
(E.D.N.Y. filed 1987).
78 Rule 33(a) states in pertinent part that "[t]he party upon whom the interrog-
atories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any,
within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories .... FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a).
Rule 34(b) states in pertinent part that "[t]he party upon whom the request [for
production] is served shall serve a written response within 30 days after the ser-
vice of the request .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
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not unreasonable because requested information tends to
be more readily available for assessment. In terrorist
cases, particularly those situations that involve geographi-
cally diverse sources of information, a period of twenty
days is more reasonable. Because the circumstances of
each action can vary, counsel should negotiate the short-
est possible notification period consistent with
practicality.
2. Meeting of Counsel
Counsel for the party seeking protection is required to
call a conference for all counsel seeking discovery in order
to disclose the information for which he seeks protection.
In turn, counsel for the discovering party is obligated to
submit to an oath of confidentiality as the price of admis-
sion to the conference. The purpose of this meeting is
threefold. First, discovering counsel will be able to see
the documents for which the other party seeks protection.
Second, the party who seeks protection will still maintain
control of the documents containing the information.
Third, and most important, during the meeting, counsel
may be able to reduce the amount of information subject
to controversy. A sample product liability order describes
the purpose of the meeting as follows:
2. That counsel for the party seeking protection arrange
for a review by counsel for all interested parties of the ma-
terial for which a Protective Order is to be sought in order
to determine:
a. Those items of information considered to be confi-
dential by the proponent for which confidentiality merits
protection without disagreement.
b. Those items of information for which the propo-
nent must seek a showing pursuant to Rule 26(c), Reg. R.
Civ. P.79
Although the party seeking protection bears the burden
ofjustification under Rule 26(c), discovering counsel may
,9 See Appendix A; Dejong, 124 F.R.D. at 207.
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readily agree that certain information will qualify for pro-
tection. Further, particularly in terrorist actions, some in-
formation may deserve total in camera treatment. A
preliminary meeting is the best place to work out the spe-
cific means of handling such information.
Some information may not merit protection. The coun-
sel seeking discovery can most easily ascertain whether
the information warrants protection. For many reasons,
certain information may not be protected regardless of
the criteria of Rule 26(c). For example, when the same
information is available through an outside source unre-
lated to the litigants, protection may be moot and the par-
ties may well drop the issue of production.80 Ultimately,
counsel for the party seeking protection must justify the
protection. If no justification exists for one particular
item of information, counsel might want to convince his
client to stop seeking protection on that point and con-
centrate on more crucial and protectable information.
Finally, a body of information will exist that discovering
and responding counsel will dispute. This data repre-
sents the information for which counsel seeking protec-
tion must bear the burden of showing good cause under
Rule 26(c). As a result of this interchange, counsel for
both parties will be able to more precisely formulate their
arguments, not only for protection but also for establish-
ing the method by which the information should be
guarded if protection is granted.
The meeting is a winnowing process that reduces and
defines the amount of information over which a protective
order battle must be fought. By agreeing to such meet-
ings, the parties can better adhere to their discovery
schedule, while preserving their rights regarding protec-
tion. The party producing the information must still
abide by the comprehensive production requirements of
Rule 26(b)(1) and must produce all nonprivileged infor-
go See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (holding that
information identical to that covered by a court's protective order but gained
through independent means may be disseminated).
PROTECTIVE ORDERS
mation. Therefore, such a meeting does nothing to injure
his position in the litigation. All counsel has done is pro-
tect information that his client regards, rightly or wrongly,
as deserving protection.
C. Post-Meeting Procedure
Once the meeting of counsel has been held, the propo-
nent of protection is obligated to seek protection for spe-
cific information. By this time, the issues have been
defined, and the total amount of material potentially sub-
ject to a protective order battle has possibly been re-
duced. The essential point is that discovery has
proceeded because counsel for the party seeking discov-
ery has had access to the requested information.
Although discovering counsel is still under an obligation
of confidentiality, this restriction does not prevent the at-
torney from further refining the discovery plan, or at least
pressing forward with further areas of inquiry relevant to
the action based upon what he has learned at the meeting.
Safeguards for the proponent of protection are worded in
Appendix B for the terrorist case as follows:
3. With respect to information in dispute, all counsel
shall be under a duty not to disclose, outside the bounds
of confidentiality, any such information received during
any meeting contemplated under paragraphs 1-2, unless
and until the Court has ruled that this information is not
entitled to confidential treatment. Should the Court rule
that confidential treatment is not warranted for particular
information, that affirmation shall be produced in open
discovery.
One further point merits consideration. In product lia-
bility or terrorist cases, counsel often may not be familiar
with the subject matter under consideration or may lack
sufficient technical knowledge to assess the claim of confi-
dentiality made by the proponent. Under these condi-
tions, counsel may want to have an expert available for
consultation. Obviously, any such expert can be covered
by a confidentiality order, subjecting him to the same re-
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strictions as counsel. The identity of that expert consult-
ant, however, will be disclosed to the other party. This
consideration must be balanced against the inability of
counsel to disclose information learned at the meeting
until the information is ruled upon. Such tactical deci-
sions can only be weighed by counsel addressing a partic-
ular issue.
D. Post-Ruling Procedure
Often, relevant and important unprotected information
will be contained in documents containing other informa-
tion that might be protected. Because the point of protec-
tive orders is to protect information and not documents,
the process proposed in this section includes a further re-
quirement. That is, information for which protection has
been obtained should be underlined without obliteration.
If the protected information is not so designated, then
there might be confusion over what information is and is
not protected. This method is particularly important
when protected documents are disclosed to other persons
involved in the action and further assures that each per-
son who deals with the protected information knows ex-
actly what information for which he or she is responsible.
One byproduct of this effort is to allow counsel for the
parties to more readily use unprotected information
found in documents containing protected information.
This requirement is set forth as follows in the sample
product liability protective order:
6. Should a document be made the subject of a Protec-
tive Order, that document shall be marked "CONFIDEN-
TIAL" and those portions of that document containing
such confidential information shall be clearly marked by
underlining or other means which will not obliterate text
or other information. The term "document" shall include
deposition transcripts, exhibits, interrogatory answers or
anything else which reproduces or paraphrases informa-
tion so marked.8'
81 See Appendix A; DeJong, 124 F.R.D. at 207.
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Although this procedure may seem cumbersome for the
parties, the benefit in maintaining confidentiality by being
particular is that the later stages of discovery and trial will
be more efficient. The party seeking protection bears the
burden of showing that an entire document and all of its
contents should fall under a protective order.
III. CONCLUSION
Given the present reality of crowded court dockets, par-
ties engaged in the litigation of aviation products liability
and terrorist cases are best advised to resolve potential
protective order disputes prior to seeking resolution by a
court. The procedures presented above represent one
such approach to resolving discovery disputes. Although
the individual facts and circumstances of each case will
dictate how details are handled, the broad procedural
guidelines proposed above establish a solid foundation
upon which parties can negotiate the scope of the discov-
ery process.
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APPENDIX A
This example of a type of protective order for a prod-
ucts liability case was used in Deong v. Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 207 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (Case No. 86-
3504-CV-S-2).
ORDER
This stipulated Order applies to documents produced
by any party to the instant action in response to the re-
quests of any other party for production, and for which a
Protective Order is sought pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. R.
Civ. P. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. That upon receipt of Interrogatories or Requests
for Production, or during deposition proceedings con-
templated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
party who claims commercial confidentiality and wishes to
seek a Protective Order pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. R.
Civ. P., shall promptly notify the other party of their in-
tent. In the case of Interrogatories or Requests for Pro-
duction, such notification regarding portions of such
Interrogatories or Requests for Production shall be made
by objection within fifteen (15) days of the receipt thereof
setting forth with reasonable specificity the precise infor-
mation sought to be protected.
2. That counsel for the party seeking protection ar-
range for a review by counsel of all interested parties of
the material for which a Protective Order is to be sought
in order to determine:
a. Those items of information considered to be confi-
dential by the proponent for which confidentiality merits
protection without disagreement.
b. Those items of information for which the propo-
nent must seek a showing pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
3. That counsel shall be under a duty to consider the
proceedings of any such meeting as confidential unless
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and until the issue of protection is set forth by the propo-
nent pursuant to Rule 26(c), and ruled upon by the Court.
4. That the party seeking protection for information
and/or documents shall show the need for such protec-
tion of each item pursuant to Rule 26(c), Fed. R. Civ. P.,
and the construction of this Rule set forth by the courts,
and will include:
a. a demonstration that the material sought to be pro-
tected is a trade secret or is subject to commercial
confidentiality;
b. a demonstration that disclosure might be harmful;
c. a demonstration that the material is treated as confi-
dential by the proponent person or organization;
d. a demonstration that disclosure would result in
harm or competitive disadvantage.
5. Parties opposing a proposed Protective Order will
then be given the opportunity to rebut the contentions of
the proponent.
6. Should a document be made the subject of a Pro-
tective Order, that document shall be marked "CONFI-
DENTIAL" and those portions of that document
containing such confidential information shall be clearly
marked by underlining or other means which will not ob-
literate text or other information. The term "document"
shall include deposition transcripts, exhibits, interro-
gatory answers or anything else which reproduces or par-
aphrases information so marked.
7. Counsel for any party may disclose such protected
documents and their contents to only the following
persons:
a. Counsel of record in this action;
b. Persons regularly employed by counsel of record
who have need to use the documents in connection with
work on this action;
c. The parties or prospective witnesses;
d. Persons used as experts or expert witnesses by the
parties or their counsel.
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8. Any person to whom any document is disclosed
(except counsel for a party herein) shall be required to
execute a disclosure agreement in the following form as a
condition of his or her access to the document:
DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
My name is
My residence address is
My business address is
I have read and fully understand the provisions of the
Protective Order that has been entered by the Court in
the lawsuit styled Barbara Dejong, individually and as Ad-
ministratrix and Personal Representative of the Estate of
David Dejong, deceased, Lance Dejong and Jason
Dejong, minors, Plaintiffs, v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc., Texas Helicopter Corporation, Gifton McCreary,
Willard Twiggs and Sharon L. Wehrenberg, as statutory
trustees of TEXAS HELICOPTER CORPORATION,
TEXAS HELICOPTER INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
FRISBY AIRBORNE HYDRAULICS, INCORPORATED,
THERMO NATIONAL INDUSTRIES, INC., DOES II
AND III, INDIVIDUALLY, Civil Action No. 86-3504-CV-
S2 in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Missouri (Southern Division).
I agree to strictly comply with the terms of that Order. I
will not disclose the documents nor any information they
contain in any form to persons other than those specifi-
cally authorized by the Protective Order, and I will not
use the documents or any information they contain other
than for purposes of this lawsuit.
My pledge of secrecy with respect to the documents set
forth in this Protective Order under this agreement con-
tinues after the lawsuit is over, and extends to other docu-
ments and information disclosed to me in the future
under the terms of this Protective Order, during the
course of this lawsuit in this matter, as well as to docu-
ments and information already disclosed to me which are
held to be subject to this Protective Order.
[56
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I understand that violation of the Protective Order or this
disclosure agreement may constitute contempt of court.
Date:
9. At the conclusion of this lawsuit, all documents cov-
ered by this Protective Order, and all copies thereof, shall
be returned to counsel for the party seeking protection
within ten (10) days.
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APPENDIX B
This example of the type of protective order appropri-
ate for terrorist cases was used in In re Inflight Explosion on
Trans World Airlines Aircraft Approaching Athens, Greece on
April 2, 1986, No. MDL-727 (E.D.N.Y. filed 1987). The
necessity for protecting information that could have sensi-
tive security implications rendered this procedure more
circumspect than that for product liability cases.
STIPULATION AND PROTECTIVE ORDER
Plaintiffs and defendant Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(hereinafter "TWA") hereby stipulate and agree to the
terms of this Protective Order as set forth below. This
Protective Order is agreed to in recognition of the
following:
a. That the nature of the instant action can involve
discovery into areas of information regarding security
procedures which could be considered to be highly
sensitive;
b. That during the course of the instant action plain-
tiffs may seek discovery of information which could be
considered to be confidential under Rule 26(c), Fed. R.
Civ. P.
c. That there should be no confusion over the nature,
range and extent of confidential information; and
d. That the burden of showing good cause for protec-
tion of the information sought to be protected lies with
the party from whom discovery is sought. Rule 26(c).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
PROTECTIVE ORDER
1. When a discovery request is received, TWA will in-
dicate which documents or other forms of information re-
sponsive to that request contain information which it
considers to be entitled to confidential treatment under
this Order. Plaintiffs' counsel will review all said docu-
ments and, if plaintiffs agree that any documents should
[56
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be confidential, said documents will be handled pursuant
to this Protective Order. As to those documents to which
counsel have not agreed, TWA will within twenty (20)
days provide to plaintiffs a list which designates each such
document in an unclassified manner and which shall indi-
cate the reason and support as to why each such docu-
ment should be confidential. Discovery will proceed as to
these disputed documents; however, plaintiffs will treat
said documents as confidential until their classification
has been resolved, and in the interim, said documents
shall be disclosed, discussed or communicated to others
only as permitted pursuant to paragraph 5(2) below.
2. Upon receipt of such a listing, counsel for plaintiffs
and defendant TWA shall confer to determine whether
they can agree as to the classification of any documents on
said list.
3. With respect to information in dispute, all counsel
shall be under a duty not to disclose, outside the bounds
of confidentiality, any such information received during
any meeting contemplated under paragraphs 1-2, unless
and until the Court has ruled that this information is not
entitled to confidential treatment. Should the Court rule
that confidential treatment is not warranted for particular
information, that information shall be produced in open
discovery.
4. For those documents either agreed to as, or ruled
as containing information which is confidential, TWA
shall affix the word "CONFIDENTIAL" on each page
thereof which contains confidential information.
5. Any information designated as confidential, includ-
ing any information, the contents thereof, any notes,
drafts, summaries, excerpts or copies thereof, and any in-
formation obtained or derived therefrom which relates to
or could reveal the content of such confidential informa-
tion shall be used only for the preparation and trial of this
litigation, including appeals, and not for any other pur-
pose whatsoever and shall not be disclosed, discussed or
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otherwise communicated in any way to anyone except as
follows:
(1) To the parties and to counsel of record for each
party and employees of such counsel or independent con-
tractors working in a ministerial or clerical capacity for
such counsel (e.g., photocopying equipment operators);
provided, however, that counsel of record shall undertake
to assure that the parties, counsel and all of counsels' em-
ployees and independent contractors, as that term is used
in this subparagraph, shall maintain the confidentiality of
any material designated as confidential. Confidential doc-
uments shall not be distributed to the parties themselves.
(2) To consultants or experts, including employees or
independent contractors of such experts employed by a
party or counsel to a party to assist in the preparation for
and trial of this litigation or any appeal therein; provided,
however, that counsel who retains any such consultant or
expert and their employees or independent contractors
shall obtain the agreement of each such consultant or ex-
pert to be bound by the terms of this Protective Order by
having each consultant or expert execute a copy of the
Confidentiality Affidavit (hereinafter "Affidavit"), at-
tached hereto as Attachment A, and provided further that
retaining counsel shall;
(a) obtain execution of the Affidavit by each consultant
or expert prior to the disclosure of any confidential infor-
mation; and
(b) maintain a current list of each and every consultant
or expert in (a) above and the original of their Affidavits
in retaining counsel's custody. For the purposes of this
subparagraph 5(2), consultants and experts are defined to
include those persons who are qualified by their experi-
ence, training or expertise to testify concerning airline se-
curity procedures and information including such matters
as security profiles. Furthermore, consultants and experts
as defined in this subparagraph 5(2), include only those
persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States District Courts.
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(3) To witnesses or potential witnesses (other than the
parties themselves); provided, however, that such witness
or potential witness is identified in writing to counsel for
TWA not less than 4 business days before disclosure to
such witness or potential witness (any objection by TWA
to disclosure to such witness or potential witness which
cannot be resolved among counsel for TWA and counsel
for plaintiffs will be submitted by TWA to the Court
within 4 business days after such witness is identified for
immediate resolution); and provided further that plain-
tiffs' counsel shall obtain the agreement of such persons
to be bound by the terms of this Protective Order by hav-
ing each such person execute a copy of the Affidavit; and
provided further that counsel shall follow the same proce-
dure as in (2)(a) and (b) above. If a witness will not agree
to this confidentiality procedure, that person will not be
provided with said confidential documents or receive con-
fidential information unless by agreement of the parties
or by Court order. However, on direct or cross-examina-
tion at deposition or trial, any counsel may show a non-
agreeing witness confidential documents or disclose confi-
dential information unless such conduct-is specifically ob-
jected to, in which case the Court shall then decide the
controversy.
(4) To court reporters utilized in connection with any
deposition in this action and their employees; provided,
however, that prior to disclosure to any court reporter,
such court reporter shall agree to be bound by the terms
of this Stipulation and Protective Order by executing a
copy of an Affidavit.
(5) To the Court; provided, however, that all portions
of motion papers, memoranda, affidavits, exhibits, tran-
scripts and other papers filed with the Court that contain,
refer to, or paraphrase any material or information desig-
nated as confidential shall be marked "CONFIDENTIAL
PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER" and shall be filed with
the Court under seal, until further order of the Court. All
oral presentations to the Court which refer to any desig-
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nated confidential information shall be held in camera,
unless the Court orders otherwise.
6. Counsel obtaining copies of said confidential infor-
mation shall maintain control of any such information in
their custody and shall assure that copies of documents
thus obtained are not disclosed to any persons who are
not cleared pursuant to this Protective Order for disclo-
sure, including Counsel and their parties who have not
signed this Protective Order. Confidential information
shall not be recopied for any purpose other than in prepa-
ration for this litigation. All such copies of confidential
information, other than those reproduced in filings of the
parties with the Court or attached thereto (which are gov-
erned by subparagraph 5(5) above), shall be returned to
TWA in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 9
below.
7. To the extent that any party considers the testi-
mony of any deponent in this litigation to be entitled to
confidential treatment under this Order, the use and dis-
semination of said testimony shall be subject to the same
procedure, restrictions and limitations described herein
as are applicable to documents containing confidential in-
formation. To this end, the court reporter taking and
transcribing the testimony of any such deponent shall be
directed to furnish copies thereof to no one except coun-
sel of record for the parties to this litigation and to the
deponent and/or his counsel. Only those portions of any
transcript that deal with confidential information will have
to be treated as confidential under this Order, although
the entire transcript will be confidential until the non-con-
fidential portions are identified. Such non-confidential
portions are not governed by this Order.
8. Every person, except Counsel, the parties and
counsel's employees or independent contractors, to
whom confidential information is to be disclosed in any
way in any format including, but not limited to docu-
ments, information or testimony, shall state his/her con-
sent to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and
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Protective Order by executing a copy of the Affidavit.
Such Affidavits shall be kept by the party's counsel of rec-
ord disclosing said confidential information and shall be
provided to counsel for TWA within thirty days of the final
termination of all of that counsel's cases in the instant
litigation.
9. Except as provided hereinabove, within the ninety
days after the conclusion of this litigation:
(1) All documents, including recorded testimony, con-
taining information designated as confidential, and all
copies thereof, in the possession or custody of any party
or its counsel, other than TWA, shall be returned to coun-
sel for TWA;
(2) All notes, memoranda, summaries, or other writ-
ings or recordings, and all copies thereof, which contain
information designated confidential, in the possession,
custody or control of the parties, their counsel or other
persons retained by them to assist in this litigation, shall
be returned to the respective counsel for each party, and
that counsel shall then destroy or return to counsel for
TWA all such confidential information in his possession;
and
(3) All plaintiffs' counsel who sign this Order will pro-
vide to counsel for TWA a written, signed representation
that paragraph 9 has been complied with.
10. Upon motion, any party may for good cause
shown apply for modification, waiver, or variance of the
terms of this Stipulation and Protective Order.
1991]

Comments

